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Policy, theory and research
John Pratt
This essay addresses some issues that can arise in the making, analysis and 
improvement of public policy, illustrated by my own work on higher education 
policy in a number of countries. It draws on the work of the philosopher Karl 
Popper, whose thinking has been central to my own work, and which I believe is 
still under-rated, particularly in relation to the social sciences and policy making. 
Policy is nearly always about change - about changing things  so that they 
improve, or to diminish hardship, or to maintain a status quo that would 
otherwise alter. Although it is not often characterised in this way, change is also 
integral to academic work, particularly to research. Research is a way of finding 
out things that were not previously known.  Even if you did not intend to change 
anything by so doing, research tells us something new or different, and changes 
will often, sooner or (perhaps much) later, ensue. Teaching, too, though not 
discussed here, is  (or at least it ought to be) about change - to equip people with 
knowledge, skills and capacities  they do not yet have. Because policy is one of 
the most important ways of achieving change, this  article focusses on research 
into and about policy. 
The nature of policy
My colleagues and I at the Centre for Institutional Studies at the University of 
East London interpret this view of policy (as concerned with change) in terms of 
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a problem-based epistemology, derived from the work of Popper (1960, 
1966a,b, 1976). We construe policy as an attempt to solve problems - of a 
particular kind, which we refer to as practical problems, or as ‘how to?’ 
questions. These are similar in conceptual terms to those of the engineer in the 
physical world - 'to achieve a transformation from one state of affairs to 
another' (Krick (1969)).  In education, for example, policy is concerned with such 
questions as: how best to educate students of different abilities; how can higher 
education be made accessible to a wide range of students? how can we sustain 
a form of higher education (for example in polytechnics) different from the 
traditional? We distinguish these kinds of questions from 'what is the case' or 
'‘why?’ questions (as identified in Swann and Pratt (1999, 2003), which are the 
predominant concern of social and physical sciences and which, generally, are 
concerned with ‘pure’ theory and produce 'propositional' knowledge (Eraut 
1994), such as the psychology of learning, seeking to add to our 
understanding of the world. Those undertaking such research add to 
knowledge ‘for its own sake’. They may not be interested in changing what 
happens outside the academy.  
This distinction between kinds of questions has a number of implications. It 
raises, first, questions about the relationship of theory and action. Whilst 
policy may rely on explicit theory or implicit assumptions about why things 
happen - such as that students learn best in small groups because they 
receive more attention from a teacher (which may or may not be true but is 
testable proposition susceptible to analysis) - establishing answers to 
theoretical questions is not the purpose of policy. For the policy-maker in the 
'real world' of time and financial constraint and of public pressure to act, the 
empirical statement (for example, that students learn best in small groups) is 
enough (provided it is accurate). That something happens as a consequence 
of something else, in policy, is what matters, because we cannot wait for 
research to test all conceivable propositions about, for example, learning; 
students need to be educated now. .  So the distinction between  kinds of 
problems is important, because attempting to solve one kind of question does 
not necessarily lead to solutions to the other.  There is a tension between the 
two. But while knowing why things happen may help to change them, it is not 
a necessary condition for change.  Knowing why does not infallibly lead to 
solutions to practical problems.  Deep-seated social or environmental factors 
that inhibit learning may not be remediable within the time-scale in which a 
teacher has to operate - or perhaps even at all.  It may be better on occasion 
to attempt different solutions and see which works best.
Of course, uninformed or ill-informed action is  dangerous, but so too is 
inaction. In the practical world of policy, you need to act on whatever 
knowledge base is  available. Yet, researchers (and policy-makers) have been 
known to argue that we should not act to remedy some pressing problem until 
we understand all the underlying issues. For example, a Working Party of the 
British Government in the 1970s argued that no action should be taken about 
social deprivation until 'the theoretical framework for the understanding of the 
whole phenomenon' was 'firmly constructed' (cited in Tunley, Travers  and 
Pratt, 1979: 10). This can condemn a generation to the problems of the 
present. Trying different solutions, with care, may identify helpful courses of 
action. This is  the method of trial and error, advocated by Popper (1976) as 
the method of the sciences and by him and a range of policy analysts (eg 
Lindblom 1959, 1979) as  an approach to policy making. It can have practical 
advantages - certainly of time - over an approach which concentrates on 'why' 
questions.
In distinguishing between practical and theoretical problems (and in this we go 
beyond Popper), there is an obvious danger of creating an unhelpful – and 
potentially false – dichotomy.  The two kinds of questions are interconnected 
as well as distinct.  Finding out how to do things also adds to theoretical 
knowledge; theory can underpin action. So I would not argue that policy-
makers should eschew theoretical knowledge. They need knowledge about the 
likely consequences of alternative courses of action, to increase the chance of 
success and avoid unintended consequences. 
But there are widespread misconceptions about the nature of knowledge, 
particularly social scientific knowledge  - and unfavourable comparisons are 
often made with the physical sciences. The laboratory based physical sciences 
examine only a small, and isolated aspect of the real physical world.  
Policymakers face some difficulties that many physical scientists do not. They 
almost invariably have to act in circumstances that they may not be able to fully 
control. This is a far cry from the traditional (though largely mistaken) view of 
science as the controlled experiment in a laboratory, under rigorous conditions 
of safety and elimination of extraneous variables (see Gould 1990: Ch IV for a 
spirited discussion on this topic). Policy is much more like engineering than it is 
like science (just as most of the complex aspects of aspects of the physical 
world are dealt with by engineering rather than 'pure' science). Many of the 
criticisms of social research arise from this failure to understand (often by social 
scientists themselves) this distinction. Policy is a social artefact, more analogous 
with a physical artefact, such as an aircraft, than it is with a scientific theory such 
as the law of gravity. Whilst the law of gravity explains and predicts the 
behaviour of an aircraft in its relation to the earth, science does not exactly 
predict all the consequences of operating such a complex artefact in a complex 
physical (let alone human) environment. There are many variables, some 
unanticipated (such as metal fatigue in the 1950s), some, like the weather, are 
probably always unpredictable - and they may all interact in unpredictable ways. 
You have to test the aircraft to identify its actual behaviour in a range of 
circumstances - an engineering task. Thus, the physical sciences offer far less 
convincing and all-embracing explanations and predictions of complex real 
world phenomena than is often thought. The development of chaos and 
complex systems theory reflects this complexity. In policy, there are similarly 
many variables interacting unpredictably, but often an expectation of a 
monocausal explanation. One need think only of the complexity of the university 
- with such variables as teacher attitude, students' backgrounds, imposed 
curriculum, institutional ethos, resource limitations - to understand why precise 
predictability is difficult to achieve. 
Yet, research can generate knowledge which can be applied in particular 
circumstances and on which policy-makers may draw (though the evidence is 
that they do not do so sufficiently (Lampinen 1992)). This  identification of limiting 
conditions is  one of the important outcomes of research (in the physical 
sciences, for example, the finding that water boils  at 100 degrees Celsius only at 
standard atmospheric pressure helps to understand why cooking at high altitude 
is  a problem. In the social sciences, the counterpart might be, for example, 
knowing under what conditions learning best takes place). Moreover, research 
produces knowledge about which there is some security about its  validity and 
understanding of its limitations. But, unfortunately this  leads us into another  (in 
this case actually as well as potentially) pointless dichotomy.
Kinds of research
The social sciences and the field of policy are bedevilled with controversy. 
There is long-standing debate about different paradigms, usually associated 
with different techniques and methods, and even about different kinds of 
‘knowledges’ (Lyotard, 1984).  An Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development report into educational research (OECD, 1995) 
distinguished a ‘positivist’ view of knowledge – independent  of context, value-
neutral  and generalisable – and ‘locally embedded’ knowledge, arising from 
reflection on experience and the ‘art of practice’.  ‘Positivist’ research is 
characterised as using ‘hard’ data and techniques such as statistical analysis.  
The ‘qualitative’ paradigm is seen as using ‘soft’ techniques such as 
interviews, ethnography or auto/biographical data.  It is often extended to the 
relativist argument that objectivity cannot be achieved: knowledge consists of 
an interpretation of meanings which we, individually, ascribe to things.  'No 
interpretation can claim final authority, since it must, in turn, be dependent 
upon other interpretations, which are further dependent on others’ (Bailey 
1999: 32).
In my view, this distinction between two broad approaches is misleading, and 
much of the discussion it raises is sterile.  It is not clear that the dichotomy is 
valid. So-called ‘positivist’ research cannot be value-free – for example in the 
choice of propositions for testing, and because all evidence depends on the 
perception of the observer.  Much research that seeks to test general 
propositions uses locally embedded knowledge and the qualitative techniques 
associated with the positivist paradigm.
A realist approach
My own work subscribes to a 'realist' epistemology (see Pawson and Tilley 
(1997) on realism and realist explanation in social science and evaluation) 
which accepts that there is a world which exists ‘out there’, independent of our 
knowledge of it, but it recognises that our knowledge of the world is a human 
construct – an interpretation, conjecture, theory.  We cannot be sure whether 
our constructs (theories) accurately describe reality.  Our observations, too, 
are theory-laden (Popper 1966: 217) and no number of observations can 
prove the truth of a theory (as Hume showed nearly 300 years ago).  But 
subjectivity of observation or interpretation does not mean that truth is 
‘relative’: 'If an assertion is true, it is true for ever’ (Popper, 1966: 221). 
Although we can never prove the truth of a theory, we can, as Popper (1972 
[1934]) showed, have some understanding of the validity of our conjectures by 
subjecting them to test.  Those theories which have withstood rigorous testing 
are still provisional; but, within known limits, we can accept them as a basis 
for action or further exploration or scrutiny.  
What this means, incidentally, is that a Popperian approach, despite frequent 
accusations to the contrary, is not ‘positivist’.  It seeks not to verify and 
produce certainty, but instead to test and to approach the truth. 
Popper put forward his views about knowledge as conjectural nearly 70 years 
ago (Popper, 1972 [1934]), well before most of the debate about relativism 
and ‘postmodern’ approaches and his work anticipates and rebuts many of 
the criticisms made later. Popper accepted, for example, that choice of 
hypothesis is value bound. Hypotheses are, of their nature, interpretations of 
the world. Power structures in society may affect or control which hypotheses 
are selected for test, and which achieve prominence. This means that 
researchers should be wary of the intentions of those who set the research 
agenda, and may have to resist particular pressures, and fight to do research 
into hypotheses or use methods that conflict with the dominant paradigm. 
They can and should take advantage of a multiplicity of interpretations to 
generate – and test – a multiplicity of hypotheses. Interpretations of reality are 
the building blocks of science.
Popper offered a way of approaching  objectivity by taking advantage of this 
plurality of view.  Generating knowledge is a social activity and it relies on the 
‘public character of scientific method’ (Popper, 1966: 218). Hypotheses and 
evidence, once made public, are no longer only the products of the individual. 
They are what Popper (1979) calls 'World 3' objects, which can be scrutinised 
independently of their source. Hypotheses and evidence are subject to 
‘something approaching free criticism’ (ibid). Criticism is often uncomfortable, 
but it makes the outcome better. Working with others, in a wider community as  
well as with immediate colleagues, is central to research. Hypotheses can be 
tested inter-subjectively (Popper, 1966: 217). What results from this 
(continuing) process is always provisional knowledge, but knowledge which 
has been subject to test. What is important about scientific knowledge, 
particularly for policy, is that we know something about its nature, origins and 
reliability.
Policy as hypothesis
Popper's approach to the generation of knowledge is summarised (Popper 
1976) in a schema starting with the  formulation of a problem (P1) for which  a 
trial solution (TS) is proposed, rigorously tested to eliminate error (EE), and 
leading to a new situation with new problems (P2):
P1 -> TT(TS) -> EE -> P2
The task of  the scientist, whether social or natural, is one of trial and  error, of 
inventing hypotheses which can be tested and submitting  them to tests. 
In policy, as  Magee (1973: 75) points out 'All government policies, indeed all 
executive and administrative decisions, involve empirical questions: "if we do X, 
Y will follow: on the other hand, if we want to achieve B we must do A"'. In this 
sense, as Magee goes on, 'a policy is  a hypothesis'  - though it might be more 
appropriate to say a policy can be treated as a hypothesis) since the empirical 
statements imply explanatory theories (Y follows X because...).  
  
This approach has a number of implications for policy-making.  Magee (1973: 
75) notes, it is  'normal for [empirical predictions] to have to be modified as  their 
application proceeds'; the policy hypothesis 'has to be tested against reality and 
corrected in the light of experience'. Thus  in policy-making as in science, 'trial 
and error' is an essential part of the process. This challenges in significant 
respects the 'ideal type' models of the classical policy analysts  (for example, 
Simon, 1947, 1957, 1960), which assume that perfection is attainable. Popper 
(1966a) extends the logic of trial and error to an advocacy of what he calls 
'piecemeal social engineering', rejecting as dangerous, tyrannous and 
ineffective the alternative utopian approach, typified by the Soviet system. In this 
he, again, anticipates and offers  epistemological support to policy analysts, such 
as  Lindblom (1979), who reject ideal-type approaches as dangerous, though 
Popper's rejection is on political as well as empirical grounds. 
Others have extended this  argument. Majone (1980: 17) writes  of policy as 
'craft', arguing that it (and interestingly also science) uses a ‘repertoire of 
procedures and judgements’ and knowledge that is  'less explicit than formalised 
theory but more objective than intuition'. Thus, we have some idea of what can 
be achieved by policy measures - for example in higher education by such as 
legal changes, financial mechanisms, quality assurance processes (see below) - 
and a reasonable expectation that they will broadly achieve what is intended, 
but equally we know that they will not be perfect, though we cannot be precise 
about how imperfect. 
A second implication of a Popperian approach is that it offers a basis for 
choice of policy.  Policy is concerned with doing things and it is important to 
do the right things.  Policymakers need to choose policies that are likely to be 
successful.  Merely to experiment is dangerous, even immoral.  Research can 
contribute to policy choice; it can offer an independent and alternative views 
of the policy options and their likely consequences, and provide a check on 
what policymakers are doing. For the  approach discussed above – unlike 
relativism, in which all points of view are equally valid – seeks preference for 
one statement over another.  As Popper put it, ‘we may speak of “better” and 
of “worse” theories ... the better theories are those with the greater content 
and the greater explanatory power....  And these ... are also the better testable 
theories; and – if they stand up to tests – the better tested theories’ (1976, p 
86).  In policy, this is crucial; we should have some grounds for believing that 
the outcomes of policy will be what we hope; ideally, policy should be based 
on theories which are not only testable but also tested. 
It is important to note that the approach offers grounds for choice in terms of a 
policy's effectiveness in solving problems. Further, by analysing policies in  
terms of their success or failure in problemsolving, it permits assessment of the 
effectiveness of policies without  accepting that what policymakers do is 
necessarily 'rational'. It is essentially pluralist, allowing alternative formulations of 
the problems to be tested. 
 
This has another implication. Popper's  problem-based theory of knowledge 
focusses attention on the way in which the policy problem has been formulated. 
This, in turn, raises a number of issues. The 'ideal models' of policy start with a 
phase variously called 'issue search' or 'scanning', which implies that the 
problems are simply there to be 'discovered'. This fails to recognise that 
problems are formulated - and different people may formulate them differently. 
For example, the policy for polytechnics in the UK in the 1960s was seen as, 
amongst other things, an attempt to solve the problem of unresponsive 
traditional university education and as a way of offering higher education to 
more people ‘on the cheap’. The problems that the policy in Austria to create a 
new set of institutions called Fachhochschulen (similar to polytechnics) in the 
1990s can be formulated as a sequence:
 Problem 1
A desire for change in Austria and pressures from outside the education 
system (including impending accession to the EU) generate a need for 
vocational higher education.
Problem 2
University resistance and constraints on public funding preclude radical 
reform of the existing institutions
Problem 3
What kinds of institutions and mechanisms of control of these 
institutions, should be used as alternatives to universities?
Problem 4 
How to avoid the problems associated with the obvious German model?
 Problem 5
The need to 'sell' the policy to the higher education community and wider 
society
Problem 6
How to implement policy, to ensure that an alien model works in the 
Austrian context.
The crucial choice of kinds of institutions and control based on the UK model 
arose largely because of the fortuitous combination of key personnel in one of 
the Austrian ministries  responsible for education and other adventitious 
circumstances. The Ministry of Education advocated a more conservative 
approach with rigid centralisation, seeing the problem in a different light from 
those in the Ministry for Higher Education who formulated the problem as one 
of breaking with tradition (Pratt 2004)
It is  clear that similar situations in other countries  lead to similar, but not 
identical outcomes: the UK abolished its polytechnic sector at the time that 
Austria created the Fachhochschulen; Finland created its polytechnic sector at 
about the same time as Austria, but unlike in Austria, it is  now the larger part of 
the higher education system.
It is  a common experience to find that little attention has been given to problem 
formulation in policy-making. Often the urge is to act, or be seen to act - 'the 
government should do something about...'. Policy documents often start with 
vague, value-laden generalisations (nowadays a 'vision') and then set out in 
detail the measures that will be taken. In other words, they elaborate the 
solutions rather than the problems. Typically, too, policy addresses not the 'real' 
problem, but what might be called 'problems of the solution'. In some respects 
the Fachhochschulen policy was an attempt to tackle the problems of the 
existing solution (the unreformed higher education system of the early 1990s). 
The nature of the new solution was conditioned by a further problem of the 
existing solution - the existence of two ministries (for education and higher 
education) with different approaches to post compulsory education.
At the Centre for Institutional Studies we have found that a Popperian approach 
enables us to explore the reasons for these weaknesses in policymaking, using 
the concept of 'situational logic'. We can look at the problem the policy could be 
seen as designed to solve and assess the situation in which the actors find 
themselves. The idea of situational logic or situational analysis was  developed 
by Popper (1972: 179) in relation to historical explanation, but it applies to public 
policy as well:
'By a situational analysis, I mean a certain kind of tentative or conjectural 
explanation of some human action which appeals to the situation in 
which the agent finds himself...(We) can try, conjecturally, to give an 
idealised reconstruction of the problem situation in which the agent found 
himself, and to that extent make the action "understandable" (or 
"rationally understandable"), that is, adequate to his situation as  he saw 
it.'
 
This technique involves conjecturing what would happens if people follow the 
logic of their situations. It enables us to posit propositions - about how people 
are expected to behave, and thus  explanations of their behaviour - which are 
testable against their actual behaviour. 
Using the concept of situational logic has proved helpful in cases where policies 
themselves were unclear. The task for researchers here is to assess the 
constraints  and opportunities within which institutions or actors  are placed (see 
Locke et al 198x). Situational logic is  helpful because it focuses on institutions' 
or actors' assessment of their interests.  It helps us to understand the interaction 
between policy formulation and action and the negotiations and political 
struggles which occur in the course of implementation. It reminds us  that for 
those who make policy and for those on whom policies act, the policy is only 
one element in their situation. The actions of, for example, higher education 
institutions faced with financial constraint or the threat of closure can be 
analysed in this way (Pratt and Silverman 198x, Locke et al, 198x). It helps to 
explain why the outcomes of policy (as was the case in both the studies referred 
to) are not always those intended by the policymakers, and - sometimes - 
inadvertently detrimental to the institutions  taking the actions, as was (arguably) 
the case with the polytechnics and colleges responding to the new competitive 
funding regime in the 1990s.
 
Situational logic offers a further tool for policy-makers and policy research. It 
offers a way of predicting some of the likely consequences of policy before it is 
implemented. It allows researchers  and policy-makers to ask: Are the proposed 
solutions prima facie apt?  We can ask: what, on the basis of hypotheses tested 
by evidence of past experience and of what we know about the logic of the 
situation, are the likely actions of, say, university managers if the government 
were to introduce particular financial reforms? The use of situational analysis 
with predictive theories tested on past policy can enable solutions to be 
proposed that might otherwise be rejected. A good example was the 
establishment of the Fachhochsculrat in Austria, as an accrediting body for the 
awards of the new Fachhochschulen.
The idea of the Fachhochsculrat drew on British experience of the Council for 
National Academic Awards. But much informed opinion in Austria assumed that 
a body composed of university academics and social partners would act 
conservatively in course validation and that the Fachhochschulrat would be 
dominated by the sectional interests of its members. British experience, 
however, indicated that such an institution's behaviour is  not predictable solely 
from its members' interests, and so it has proven in practice (Pratt and Hackl 
1999, Pratt 2004). As noted above, it was possible for those with knowledge of 
the British experience to predict that the institution would broadly fulfil its 
purpose (though with some differences because of its  different environmental 
conditions). Subsequent research has identified some of the factors in the 
situation which contributed to this particular outcome (Pratt, 2004: Ch 6).
Thus, for reformers, situational logic offers the understanding that the potential 
for change in institutions consists not so much in issuing  instructions, as in 
setting up the situations in which they operate, the logic of which  will make 
desired outcomes more likely. It draws attention to the importance of social 
institutions which constitute a large element of any social situation and which 
are the usually the elements most susceptible to change. As Popper (1966b: 93) 
says  '...institutions and traditions are neither the work of God nor of nature, but 
the results of human actions and decisions, and alterable by human actions and 
decisions.'   Policy is  implemented through social institutions (such as 
governance structures and accreditation agencies). We have to  ensure that 
these are fit for their purposes, whether they are achieving what is   required of 
them.  Again, the process is one of problem formulation, trial solution and 
testing.  As a result, we can  adjust the institution or use it differently. 
 
The Popperian approach places importance on testing predictions against 
evidence. Policy-as-hypothesis can be tested against its outcomes, in the same 
way as a scientific hypothesis is  tested. There has been a burgeoning of 
monitoring and evaluation of policies over the last decade or two, reflecting the 
development of the 'contract culture' and increased demands for public 
accountability (Scott 1995). Yet these evaluations are still often misconceived. 
One of the features  of current 'managerialist' approaches to policymaking is a 
hierarchical process, which starts  with a statement of 'vision' and usually 
involves a 'mission statement'. From these may be derived strategic objectives, 
and from them a sequence of operational objectives. These in turn may be used 
to develop statements of expected 'outputs', against which actual performance 
is  to be assessed - usually on an annual basis. Elaborate monitoring and review 
processes are usually proposed to secure this assessment. 
 
What such processes usually achieve is  an assessment only of the extent to 
which the programme - the chosen solution - has been implemented. This may 
not result in the problem(s) that the programme was set up to tackle being 
solved. The approach espoused here makes clear that testing of a solution must 
be in terms of solving the policy problem(s). For example, the Fachhochschulen 
policy should be tested not just in terms of the number, kind and quality of 
students recruited or courses running, but in terms of such outcomes as the 
impact on students' learning, the employment market and so on, depending on 
the nature of the problems in the first place.
 
A further reason for the emphasis on testing outcomes in practice is that it is, in 
any real situation, almost always impossible to predict all the consequences of 
the complex interactions between institutions, people and other factors. As 
Magee (1973: 75) puts it, 'it is  often only by critical examination of the practical 
results [of policy]... that some of the mistakes are to be identified'. Any action 
may have unintended consequences. Human action is not always consciously 
defined or explicable in terms of needs, hopes or motives.  Even consequences 
which arise 'as  the result of conscious  and intended human actions are,  as a 
rule, the indirect, the unintended and often unwanted byproducts of such 
actions' (Popper 1966b: 93).  There are likely to be unintended but largely 
unpredictable consequences of most policies  (not least because of their very 
complexity). A realist approach is concerned with outcomes, whether they are 
intended or otherwise. It is  through this that we may learn how policy works, and 
what works. One of the both unpredicted and unintended consequences of the 
British polytechnic policy of the late 1960s was the emergence of a group of 
colleges of higher education aspiring to polytechnic status. In Austria, the way 
the Fachhochschulen have been managed and financed has led to the 
(unintended and I think undesirable) emergence of the Lander (regions) as 
brokers in the distribution of student places between their institutions.
 Conclusion
This article set out to discuss the link between policy and research and thus 
between practice and theory. I have argued that there is a crucial distinction 
between kinds of problems - practical and theoretical - but that though they are 
distinct there is a relationship - and tension - between them. Policy is concerned 
with practical problems, and I have set out an approach which, drawing on the 
logic underlying the development of knowledge, offers a way of tackling both 
practical and theoretical problems. It seems to me that much policymaking in 
Britain today, although it follows an established structure in the managerialist 
mode, and despite the concerns of government to produce 'joined up' 
policymaking and 'evidence based policy' lacks  an intellectual underpinning of 
the kind suggested here. At its  worst it is merely formulaic, with policymakers 
filling in spaces under a series  of predetermined headings. One outcome is that 
the reverse of these intentions is often achieved, in particular that policy is 
increasingly short term: it is a commonplace that the policy space of education is 
crowded with 'initiatives', as new measures are introduced to tackle apparently 
ever-increasing problems. In part this reflects, I suspect, an impatience in 
government, heightened by an increasingly raucous press. But it also reflects 
the lack of understanding of the nature of problems, solutions and evaluation. A 
vision, good though it may be for political purposes, is not a good place from 
which to start policy, for it prescribes a solution without being clear about the 
nature of the problem. Similarly, although policy is  implemented through 
institutions, understanding of what is possible to achieve by - and the likely 
consequences of - particular institutional devices is limited (think of hospital 
waiting lists). In the past, long established civil servants developed this 
knowledge (and kept it arcane); as the civil service has changed so this 
'institutional memory' has declined; situational logic could have a important role 
to play here to build this knowledge base - and perhaps help to ensure that 
solutions last rather longer than they seem to now. 
Note
This working paper draws on material in Swann and Pratt  (1999) (especially 
Chapter 4), Swann and Pratt  (2003) (especially Chapter 4) and Pratt 
(forthcoming).
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